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This paper quantifies the misallocation of manufacturing 
output and factors of production between establishments 
across Indian districts during 1989–2010. It first distills 
a number of stylized facts about misallocation in India, 
and demonstrates the validity of misallocation metrics 
by connecting them to regulatory changes in India that 
affected real property. With this background, the study 
next quantifies the implications and determinants of 
factor and output misallocation. Although more-produc-
tive establishments in India tend to produce more output, 
factors of production are grossly misallocated. A better 
allocation of output and factors of production is associ-
ated with greater output per worker. Misallocation of land 
plays a particularly important role in these challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We study the misallocation of land and buildings inputs and other factors of production for the 
Indian manufacturing sector. Our paper makes four contributions. We first document that factor 
misallocation among establishments is substantially worse than that of output, and that districts 
vary substantially in the efficiency with which factors are allocated to the most productive 
establishments. Second, we validate these indices for studying land and building misallocation 
by showing their close connection to local policy and tax reforms in property markets. Building 
from these baselines, our third contribution is to demonstrate how land and building 
misallocation fosters the misallocation of output in local areas, in both the current context and 
also looking forward. We also show a strong connection of land and building misallocation to 
reduced labor productivity for districts. 
 
The economic magnitudes of our results are substantial and provide an important lens for 
considering how to best foster economic development. Economists and policy makers have 
traditionally sought to encourage development and growth through increasing factor productivity 
and fostering factor accumulation. We show that a better factor allocation across establishments 
would also generate very large economic gains. We quantify that a one standard deviation 
decrease in the misallocation of land and buildings is associated with about a 25% increase in 
output per worker. This is equivalent to a six-fold increase in the land supply for manufacturing 
establishments in these districts. We also observe that the misallocation of other inputs to firms 
hampers performance, but land and building access appears especially important in India. This 
parallels accounts in the press of the exceptional and stifling nature of Indian land markets. 
These insights provide an important input to the achievement of economic growth and the World 
Bank’s twin goals of reducing extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.  
 
Our paper provides three distinct contributions to the academic literature. First, as we discuss 
below, there have been many studies arguing the importance of misallocation. The consequences 
of misallocation are usually inferred indirectly by asking a model what would be the aggregate 
consequences of reduced misallocation. That is, extant claims about the importance of 
misallocation rely on measures of aggregate misallocation and computations of counterfactuals 
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from particular models. In contrast, we provide direct evidence about the importance of 
misallocation by investigating empirically the link between factor misallocation across 
establishments and output per worker, using subnational regions in cross-section and in panel.  
 
Second, increasing the productivity of factors of production, fostering their accumulation, and 
reducing their misallocation can only be viewed as proximate causes of economic growth and 
development. Importantly, as part of our metric validation, we begin to make connections 
between policies and factor misallocation. Our findings suggest that factor misallocation is not 
exogenously determined but is instead affected by policies. More generally, we think of our 
results as emphasizing the importance of “frictions” as key determinant of the efficiency of 
factor allocation and, in turn, prosperity. Policies can be a source of friction. Better policies can 
also reduce frictions and improve allocation. Our emphasis on frictions differs from many 
models in the literature that rely on idiosyncratic distortions as the root cause of misallocation. 
 
Third, we highlight the uniquely important role played by land and buildings in misallocation. 
We attribute this to the fact that choosing a location is a decision that conditions many others and 
cannot easily be changed, especially in an environment with poorly functioning land markets. 
More productive establishments will have a tough time buying more machines or employing 
more workers if they have no room to accommodate them. Land may also be a uniquely 
important asset for establishments that seek to expand since it can be used as collateral for 
external financing. While we do not take a stance regarding the exact mechanism through which 
land and buildings affect factor misallocation, our results highlight that land used for non-
agricultural production may play a more important role than hitherto thought. Better land policies 
can make land more broadly available and reduce the frictions associated with land transactions. 
We are nonetheless aware that the elimination of frictions on the land market would require more 
than better land use regulations and a more efficient taxation of properties. Better-functioning 
land markets also require clearly defined property rights, a reliable land registry, and a number of 
other institutional improvements. This is a considerable challenge in a country like India where 
property rights for land and buildings are poorly defined and often conflict with tenancy rights.  
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To conduct our study, two main challenges need to be overcome. The first is to develop a 
methodology that allows us to explore the effects of misallocation and its determinants in a 
cross-section of districts. To do this, we develop indices of misallocation in the spirit of the 
decomposition originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). In essence, misallocation can be 
measured by the difference between un-weighted mean establishment productivity and mean 
establishment productivity weighted, typically, by output. This difference is proportional to the 
covariance between establishment productivity and output. A higher covariance indicates a more 
efficient allocation as more productive establishments produce more output.  
 
Our analysis starts with two simple observations. First, Olley-Pakes misallocation indices can be 
computed not only for output but also for each factor of production separately. Second, these 
misallocation indices need not be computed exclusively at the country level. They can also be 
produced for subnational units such as districts. Interestingly, there is a lot of variation in 
misallocation across the different misallocation indices and for each index across districts. We 
then think about misallocation as an intermediate outcome which we can relate to final outcomes 
of interests such as output per worker (or establishment productivity). We can also relate these 
intermediate misallocation outcomes to deeper causes such as policies or the local characteristics 
of districts.  
 
More specifically, our analysis proceeds in five steps. The first is to estimate the productivity of 
all establishments in the data and factor shares for all industries. Establishment productivity is a 
necessary input to measure misallocation, and we consider several approaches to estimating 
productivity. Our second step is to compute misallocation indices for output and for each factor 
of production at the district level. The main difficulty here is that misallocation is most 
meaningfully computed at the industry level since industries differ in their factor intensity. 
Measures of misallocation at the district-industry level must thus be aggregated across industries 
to obtain a district-level measure. After distilling some stylized facts about misallocation across 
districts, our third step validates these metrics for studying land and building access by showing 
a connection of them to unanticipated local policy reforms that affect property markets. 
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In the fourth step, we quantify the relationship between various forms of misallocation. This step 
allows us to tease out the unique role played by the misallocation of land and buildings among 
Indian establishments. This misallocation of land and buildings is at the root of much of the 
misallocation of output. The last step examines the effects of factor misallocation on 
establishment productivity and output per worker. This analysis affords statements about which 
forms of misallocation matters more in Indian districts. Again, land and buildings appear 
especially important given their relatively small cost share.  
 
The second main challenge is one of data. To compute measures of misallocation at the district 
level, establishment/plant data are needed as large firms may be present in many districts. 
Although it is always possible to apportion consolidated firm-level accounts across their various 
establishments, it is easier and more accurate to exploit establishment-level information. Our 
analysis is also best conducted using detailed information about the balance sheets of 
establishments to distinguish between different types of fixed factors. Although our approach can 
be applied to more aggregated factors (e.g., all fixed inputs), some of our more interesting 
findings come from our ability to distinguish more finely across different forms of capital, such 
as land and building vs. other fixed assets. Our analysis also requires a large country with enough 
subnational units to exploit sufficient cross-sectional information. Each subnational unit also 
need to be large enough for our measures of misallocation to carry some information and not be 
driven only by sample variation. Sampling issues are all the more important since our indices of 
misallocation must be first calculated at the level of each sector and district and then aggregated 
across sectors within each district. Finally, our country of study should be heterogeneous enough 
for there to be sufficient variation in misallocation. 
 
India is well suited for our purpose. The government conducts regular censuses of production at 
the establishment level and requires establishments to report their assets with an unusual level of 
detail. India is also an extremely large country composed of several hundred districts, most of 
which contain enough establishments for us to compute informative measures of misallocation.  
 
Although we discuss our methodology and findings in relation to the literature in greater detail 
below, we note that our work mainly contributes to the misallocation literature recently pushed 
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forward by the seminal contributions of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009). As already mentioned we explicitly measure how factor misallocation affects output per 
worker using a cross-section of subnational units rather than infer it indirectly from a model. We 
also show how factor misallocation affects output misallocation. Finally, we provide evidence 
regarding the effects of some economic policies on factor allocation.  
 
2. Background and data 
 
Our analysis considers five surveys from two major sources of data: the Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI) and National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). These data have been used 
extensively in prior research on the Indian economy, including Ghani et al. (2014) from which 
the first part of this data description builds on. ASI is a survey of the organized sector undertaken 
annually by the Central Statistical Organization, a department in the Ministry of Statistics and 
Program Implementation of the Government of India. Under the Indian Factory Act of 1948, all 
establishments employing more than 20 workers without using power or 10 employees using 
power are required to be registered with the Chief Inspector of Factories in each state. This 
register is used as the sampling frame for the ASI. The ASI extends to the entire country, except 
the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Sikkim and Union Territory (UT) of 
Lakshadweep.  
 
The ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics for the organized manufacturing sector in 
India. It provides statistical information to assess changes in the growth, composition, and 
structure of organized manufacturing sector comprising activities related to manufacturing 
processes, repair services, gas and water supply, and cold storage. As noted in Ghani et al. 
(2012b), organized manufacturing contributes a substantial majority of India’s manufacturing 
output, while the unorganized sector accounts for a large majority of employment for Indian 
manufacturing workers. Manufacturing activity undertaken in the unorganized sector, such as 
households (own-account manufacturing enterprise) and unregistered workshops, is covered by 
the NSSO. The distinction between the organized and unorganized sectors broadly captures the 
difference between formal and informal sectors. 
 
7 
 
Our study considers data taken from 1989-90, 1994-95, 2000-01, 2005-06, and 2010-11. In the 
first four instances, we use contemporaneous ASI and NSSO surveys. In the last period, we use 
2009-10 ASI data and 2010-11 NSSO data. For simplicity, we normally refer to a sample survey 
by its starting year—for example, the sample survey in the year 2005-06 is referred to as the 
2005 survey. We use 2010 in the tables and text to refer to the years 2009-10 for ASI data and 
years 2010-11 for NSSO data.  
 
Establishments in both the organized and unorganized sectors provide information on the value 
of the land and buildings that they own. Although both sectors provide this information, only the 
organized sector surveys offer the distinction across land and buildings consistently for all the 
survey years under consideration.1 For the unorganized sector, this separation between land and 
buildings stops in 2000. Thus, in this sector, we always consider land and buildings together. 
 
Some businesses rent the land that they operate on. The questionnaires for both sectors ask 
renting establishments to provide information on the rent paid for land and buildings. The NSSO 
goes a step further and requires establishments report the value of the land and buildings that 
they rent. The organized sector survey also provides information on the rent paid and/or received 
for land and buildings for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010. To impute the value of land and 
buildings rented by establishments, we use the reported values for the land and buildings when 
available. Otherwise, our imputations use rents and estimated local capitalization rates as 
described in appendix box 1. Appendix tables 1a and 1b provide details and exact wording of the 
questions pertaining to land and building values that appear in the respective survey 
questionnaires. In robustness checks, we duplicate our main regressions for the samples of only 
owners and only renters and find similar results.  
 
The raw data from the five survey years contain 262,911 observations in the organized sector and 
955,234 observations in the unorganized sector. In the organized sector, we retain establishments 
whose status is declared to be open, thereby dropping establishments that were closed during the 
                                                          
1 The survey provides data on opening value, closing value, gross value, depreciation and so on for land and 
buildings. Closing net value of land and buildings is taken as the value of land and buildings owned. To obtain the 
value of the total land and buildings owned by establishments in the organised sector, we simply sum the separate 
values of land and buildings. 
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reference year, non-operational, deleted due to deregistration, or out of coverage (that is 
belonging to defense, oil storage, etc.). This step leaves 216,898 observations in the organized 
sector. Next, we drop establishments that do not belong to the manufacturing sector. Such 
industries may relate to mining and quarrying, fishing and aquaculture, or services sectors (e.g., 
electricity; water supply; transportation; wholesale/retail trade). This pruning yields a sample 
count of 203,031 for the organized sector and 655,571 for the unorganized sector. Finally, we 
delete observations with missing, null, negative, or extremely large values of output (being 
greater than 1 billion rupees), output per worker (being null or greater than 1 million rupees), or 
employment (being over 500,000). At this stage, we also delete from the NSSO surveys the 
states that are not surveyed by ASI. We also delete observations that have blank state codes. 
These exclusions result in a sample of 169,814 observations for the organized sector and 651,808 
for the unorganized sector.  
 
Table 1 reports a number of descriptive statistics about the data we use and its coverage. Panel A 
provides a raw count of observations after basic pruning for each type of establishment and year 
of data. Panel B reports the corresponding number of establishments in Indian manufacturing. 
Panel C contains the number of establishments that report the value of land and buildings owned, 
while panel D reports average values of land and buildings owned by establishments in Indian 
manufacturing after winsorization at the 1% level. Panel E contains some information about post 
imputation values and the transformation of rental values into asset values.  
 
Finally, panel F reports the revenue shares of land and building for various subsets of Indian 
manufacturing establishments and years of data. As these trends are of interest in their own right, 
Ghani et al. (2014) provides additional tabulations and notes on how these trends compare to that 
of energy usage, the primary subject of Ghani et al. (2014). Two key results are worth noting 
here. First, the early stability of land and building usage per output unit and its rise in 2010 are 
consistently observed when preparing the data with alternative procedures. Second, a 
decomposition exercise finds that almost all of the increase in land and building intensity is 
occurring within districts, rather than being due to reallocation of activity over districts (e.g., 
establishments moving toward high-priced areas). This within-district feature motivates the 
emphasis in this paper on district-level analyses. 
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To estimate productivity and misallocation, we need to further clean up the data by dropping 
establishments with negative value added, missing raw materials value, unknown district names, 
and/or locations in small and conflict states. These include Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Dadra 
& Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Jammu & Kashmir, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland and Assam. The final sample that we work with for productivity and misallocation 
metrics consists of 145,829 observations from the organized sector and 575,989 observations 
from the unorganized sector. This leaves us with over 320 districts each year for the two sectors, 
and appendix table 2 provides exact counts for each sector and year. These numbers roughly 
correspond to the number of districts for which land and building values are available. Although 
we end up considering only about half of the 630 Indian districts in our study, the included 
districts represent over 95% of establishments, employment, and output in the manufacturing 
sector throughout the study period.2 
 
3. Measuring misallocation 
 
3.1 Output and factor misallocation 
 
Firms differ enormously in what they produce and how they produce it. Even within narrowly 
defined market segments, firms are very heterogeneous in how productive they are (Fox and 
Smeets, 2011; Syverson, 2011). For example, a firm at the top decile of productivity is twice as 
productive as a firm in the bottom decile for a typical manufacturing industry in the United 
States (Syverson, 2011). For India and China, a firm at the top productivity decile may be five 
times as productive as a firm at the bottom decile (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).  
 
A distribution of firm productivity within a given industry, however narrowly defined, is not 
necessarily a sign of inefficiency. Managers of the most productive firms may not be able to 
supervise all the workers in the industry (Lucas, 1978). Some poorly productive firms may also 
produce some highly specific varieties that some consumers value (Melitz, 2003). High transport 
                                                          
2 Our analyses also use a number of social, economic and geographic characteristics of districts as well as 
information about specific policies. We describe these data as they are introduced. 
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costs may also lead to less productive firms serving customers in remote areas. At the same time, 
a number of features may prevent firms from operating efficiently. So far the literature has 
focused mainly on idiosyncratic taxes on inputs and outputs faced by firms (Restuccia and 
Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) experiencing financial market frictions (Banerjee and 
Moll, 2010; Midrigan and Xu, 2014) and poor management (Bloom et al., 2013). 
 
This said, most models of heterogeneous firms predict that more productive firms should be 
producing more output and using more factors of production. More specifically, these models 
imply that the most productive firms should be the ones with the highest revenue and should also 
be using the largest amounts of factors of production. It is easy to understand that if a more 
productive firm uses a smaller amount of land, less capital, and fewer workers than a less 
productive firm, total output would increase by reallocating some amount of these factors of 
production from the less to the more productive firm. Then, from this, it follows that the ranking 
of firms by productivity should be the same as the ranking of firms by factor usage. Productivity 
and factor usage should be perfectly (rank-)correlated under a perfectly efficient allocation of 
factors across firms.  
 
Thus, a less than perfect correlation between productivity and factor usage indicates a 
misallocation of factors across firms. The worse the correlation between productivity and factor 
usage, the more misallocated are factors of production and the less output is produced relative to 
an efficient allocation. Using this insight, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose to measure 
misallocation using the covariance between firm productivity and output. Box 1 provides some 
technical details. This measure of allocation is also equal to the difference between un-weighted 
and weighted productivity, where the weights are the firm shares of output. The Olley-Pakes 
(OP) measure of misallocation—sometimes referred to as the OP decomposition—has been 
widely used to explore issues such as changes in factor allocation in the telecom industry after 
deregulation (Olley and Pakes, 1996), the effects of structural reforms in developing countries 
(Eslava et al., 2006), productivity differences across countries (Bartelsman et al., 2013), and the 
role financial institutions in factor allocation (Midrigan and Xu, 2014). 
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Relative to extant literature, we expand the OP approach in two directions. First, as already 
noted, while the literature computes misallocation indices using output or value added, analogue 
misallocation indices can be computed through weighting establishments by their use of any 
given factor of production instead of output. More formally, depending on what is used to 
measure establishment share, we can build measures of allocation efficiency for output, value 
added, employment, land, land and buildings, etc. This variety of measures allows us to explore 
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how various measures of allocation efficiency are related to each other and which ones matter to 
determine aggregate outcomes. 
 
Second, we compute misallocation indices for subnational units. At this point it is important to 
clarify what a measure of misallocation within a district captures. Computing the misallocation 
of, say, employment in each district separately yields a measure of the misallocation of workers 
within each district, taking as given the distribution of employment across districts. Hence, the 
misallocation of employment within districts is only one component of the misallocation of 
employment in the entire country. For instance, it is possible to imagine situations where more 
productive establishments employ more workers within each district, but that districts that host 
more productive establishments on average have access to substantially fewer workers than less 
productive districts. This would be a case of a low level of misallocation within districts but a 
high level of misallocation across districts. While we leave the analysis of misallocation across 
districts for ongoing work as described in the conclusions, we note that our focus on within-
district misallocation is warranted by the fact that within- and between-district misallocations 
probably have very different root causes and most likely call for different policies. 
 
3.2 Issues with measuring misallocation at the district level 
 
Our primary metrics of misallocation focus on the combined organized and unorganized 
manufacturing sectors, and we also directly compute the misallocation within each sector. We 
compute indices of misallocation for output, value added, and factors of production taken 
individually, such as employment, or in subsets, such as land and buildings or all fixed assets. 
We then use these measures of misallocation across Indian districts in various regressions that 
seek to validate their usefulness and describe the implications of factor misallocation.  
 
Leaving aside for now the issues associated with the specifics of our regressions, our approach 
raises two broad concerns. The first is that the measures of misallocation that we use, while 
intuitive and informative, are not structural. Below, we compare the estimates obtained from our 
regressions to counterfactuals from the models used in the literature so far, typically finding 
quite consistent results.  
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The second main issue is that our approach requires measures of misallocation at the district 
level, while the OP approach generates measures of misallocation within industries. To reconcile 
this requirement of a district-level misallocation measure with industry-level measures, the most 
obvious solution is to compute misallocation at the industry level within each district and then 
aggregate across industries within each district. 
 
Aggregating industry-level indices of misallocation within each district to obtain a district index 
of misallocation can be performed in several ways. Our baseline computation sums industry 
misallocation across all industries and weights each industry by its corresponding local share of 
manufacturing activity. For instance, to compute the misallocation of employment within a 
district, employment misallocation is summed across industries using the employment share of 
industries in the district as weights. 
 
While this is a natural and straightforward way to aggregate across industries, other aggregations 
are possible. In their cross-country comparison, Bartelsman et al. (2013) use constant sector 
shares. Indices with constant sector shares provide a partial measure of district misallocation that 
does not account for the possibility of more misallocated sectors having a tendency to 
predominantly locate in more misallocated districts. Another drawback of constant-share 
aggregation is that misallocation is less accurately measured in smaller industries with fewer 
establishments. From a measurement perspective, it is better to give a small weight to an industry 
that is locally small even though this industry might be much larger nationally. Another 
alternative is to sum misallocation across industries weighting each by its local share, as in our 
main design, but also subtract the average tendency of each sector to be misallocated in the 
country. This type of index measures excess misallocation relative to what would be expected 
given the local composition of industrial activity. Although we focus on our preferred measure of 
misallocation described in box 1, we compare our results to those obtained with constant-share 
aggregations and with aggregations that isolate excess misallocation.  
 
Among possible alternative measures of misallocation, we also compute simpler indices based 
on the covariance between output or a given factor of production and productivity across all 
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establishments regardless of their industry. The main advantage of measuring misallocation in 
this manner is that the covariance is measured over a much larger sample (all manufacturing 
establishments instead of all establishments in an industry). The main problem with this 
alternative is the following. When, say, capital intensity differs between two industries, it is not 
immediately obvious that the lower productivity establishment in the more capital-intensive 
industry should be using less capital than the more productive establishment in the less capital-
intensive industry. If the differences in productivity are small enough, the establishment in the 
more capital-intensive industry should be using more capital even though its productivity is 
lower. Because we find factor coefficients to be relatively constant across industries in our 
productivity estimations, this problem may not be as important as it first appears. It remains 
nonetheless that this simpler metric will overstate the true level of misallocation. 
  
A possible refinement is to correct for the use of factors by each establishment by the intensity 
with which the industry of this establishment uses factors. Then we can use these corrected factor 
measures to compute equation (3) across all establishments irrespective of their industry. For 
instance, in an industry that uses twice as much capital as the average industry, we can multiply 
the amount of capital used by establishments in this industry by 0.5 to normalize its capital use 
and then compute misallocation directly across all establishments. 
 
The OP measure of misallocation described by equations (3) and (4) in box 1 is not the only 
available measure of the efficiency of factor allocation across establishments. In a celebrated 
article, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) propose a model of heterogeneous firms facing idiosyncratic 
distortions. They show that under some conditions, the efficiency of factor allocation across 
firms can be measured by the dispersion of observed firm productivity.3 This alternative measure 
of misallocation has been widely used, and Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) provide a discussion. 
We note in particular the work of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) and Restuccia and 
Santaeulalia-Llopis (2014). They focus on land as well, but they are concerned with agricultural 
                                                          
3 Following Foster et al (2008), they call this measure of productivity revenue productivity (TFPR). This is the 
concept of productivity usually estimated by economists and it embeds the price at which output is sold. TFPR is 
thus a measure of the ability of firms to generate revenue. It stands in contrast with physical productivity (TFPQ), 
which measures the ability of firms to produce output. We return to this distinction below. 
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land in rural areas whereas we deal with land used by manufacturing establishments, which are 
often found in urban settings in developing countries. 
 
The OP misallocation measure for output/value added, the OP misallocation measure for factors, 
and the Hsieh-Klenow misallocation measure have interesting and subtle differences. Our 
measure of output misallocation essentially captures the covariance between output and 
productivity. Recall that output is given by: 𝑌 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃. 𝐿𝑎 . (𝑇&𝐵)𝑏 . (𝑂𝐴)𝑐 where TFP is an estimated 
productivity residual, L is employment, T&B is land and buildings and OA is other fixed assets. In 
situations where more productive establishments use less of factors relative to less productive 
establishments, the covariance between productivity and output decreases and our measure of 
output misallocation increases. However, the misallocation of factors will also allow poorly 
productive establishments to remain in business. Then, a worse misallocation of factors will 
perhaps increase the variance of productivity for active establishments. In turn, this increases the 
covariance between output and productivity. Hence, our measure of output misallocation will 
embed both the “negative” direct effect of factor misallocation and a “positive” indirect effect of 
market selection. Our measures of misallocation for individual factors are not directly affected 
by this second effect. They only consider whether more productive firms utilize more of a given 
factor. This is why looking at factor misallocation may be more informative in some contexts 
than looking at output misallocation. Finally, HK misallocation only considers the dispersion of 
productivity. That is, relative to the OP measure of output misallocation, it only accounts for the 
indirect market selection effect and does so in the opposite direction relative to the OP metric for 
output or value added. 
 
Given these differences, we also follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and use the dispersion of 
establishment productivity to measure misallocation and check the robustness of some of our key 
results. Unfortunately, the HK approach offers only one general measure of misallocation. 
Unlike our extension of the OP approach, it does not allow us to distinguish between output and 
factor misallocation or identify differences in misallocation among factors. 
 
As made clear by this discussion, there is no perfect measure of misallocation at the district level. 
As described below, the productivity measure that we use in equation (3) of box 1 is estimated as 
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a residual from a regression using imperfect data. Then, computing industry misallocation in 
each district raises some sampling issues as the number of surveyed establishments is 
numerically large—larger, for example, than the survey size of the Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers in the United States—but not a universal census for each district. Finally, 
aggregating across industries raises further challenges, as just highlighted. Systematic 
measurement error is a worry only to the extent that it is correlated with misallocation. That we 
may over- or understate misallocation in all districts is not an issue, as our main sources of 
variation are either differences across districts or changes over time within districts. It is 
nonetheless possible to imagine that measurement error varies systematically with misallocation. 
For instance, establishment productivity in industries subject to greater misallocation may be 
measured more accurately as the frictions that drive misallocation make the use of factors of 
production less responsive to demand shocks, or vice versa. This would lead us to understate 
misallocation in more misallocated industries and perhaps in more misallocated districts. Adding 
to this, classical measurement error will lead us to underestimate the true effect of factor 
misallocation when used as an explanatory variable in a regression. Although we estimate large 
economic effects of factor misallocation, our results may understate the true impact.  
 
3.3 Estimating total factor productivity 
 
To compute the indices of misallocation defined above, we need a measure of establishment 
productivity. Since productivity is not directly observed, it is usually estimated as a residual 
measuring the ability of an establishment to produce conditional on the inputs that it uses. There 
are two main issues associated with this standard approach. First, as already noted, in a large 
majority of cases, we measure the revenue that an establishment receives, not the physical 
quantity of output it produces. Even when the number of units produced is observed, it is unclear 
what this measure means in most industries since product quality is highly heterogeneous. So 
while we are able to observe the ability of firms to generate revenue, we are not able to observe 
their ability to produce a quantity and quality of output.  
 
The second important estimation issue with production functions relates to the endogeneity of 
inputs. Any firm-specific demand or productivity shock will affect both the residual of the 
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production function estimation and the demand for factors of production. This endogeneity of 
input choices has received much attention since Olley and Pakes’ (1996) seminal work. In our 
work below, we follow the approach subsequently developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
(LP) which relies on the use of intermediate inputs, in particular energy consumption, to detect 
demand and productivity shocks. The key idea that underlies this approach is that demand and 
productivity shocks will affect energy consumption but not capital stocks, which are decided 
before those shocks are known.  
 
The LP approach for productivity estimation requires a panel of firms, which is unfortunately not 
available to us from the ASI and NSSO surveys that contain district identifiers. Using 
information for establishments in the same location and industry, we can nonetheless implement 
an approach in the same spirit as LP that only requires information from the panel of districts. 
The main idea is to use energy consumption at the district level to detect temporal local demand 
shocks in a manner parallel to that done at the plant level with the LP methodology. This 
approach was initially developed by Sivadasan (2009). We appropriately tailored it to our needs 
as explained formally in appendix box A1. 
 
We show below that we obtain similar results when using OLS to estimate productivity levels. 
That OLS and our LP-Sivadasan measures of productivity should deliver very similar results is 
consistent with our findings that extremely large frictions generate significant misallocation. It is 
then only natural to expect very little factor adjustments for firms following demand shocks. A 
more subtle worry is whether capital is actually the long-run factor for Indian firms. We find 
very similar outcomes in estimations that treat labor as the long-run factor.   
 
In summary, to alleviate concerns focused on specific approaches to estimating productivity, we 
replicate our main regressions for measures of misallocation computed from a variety of 
productivity estimators. To alleviate concerns coming from sampling issues in small industries, 
we replicate our results imposing a higher selection threshold for local industries and with 
various weighting strategies. Finally, to alleviate concerns regarding our aggregation of industry 
misallocation indices at the district level, we replicate our results for a variety of aggregation 
approaches. 
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3.4 Some descriptive facts about output per worker and productivity in India  
 
Figures 1a and 1b (figures are not included here, but available upon request) show output per 
worker in the organized and unorganized sector, respectively. Both figures are consistent with 
well-known aggregate statistics. Districts with high output per worker are found in the north 
western part of the country (e.g., Gujarat, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, Maharashtra). These are 
also states with a high GDP per capita relative to the rest of the country. On the other hand, low 
output per worker is more prevalent in the eastern part (e.g., Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa). High 
output per worker is also evident around major population centers, including Bangalore and 
Chennai as examples outside of the states already mentioned. Finally, output per worker is 
typically higher in coastal areas relative to the interior. 
 
Comparing the scales of figures 1a and 1b, it is immediate that output per worker is nearly 
everywhere much higher in the organized sector. There is also an apparent correlation between 
output per worker in the organized and unorganized sectors across districts, but it is modest at 
0.09. Output per worker is high in the unorganized sector relative to the organized sector in 
Kerala, while the opposite holds true in West Bengal. 
 
Turning to productivity estimates, table 2 reports the estimated coefficients for 22 two-digit 
manufacturing industries. We start with the combined estimations for the organized and 
unorganized sectors and then treat each sector separately. A number of important features 
emerge from this table. 
 
First, the organized and unorganized sectors differ in their capital and employment intensity. The 
mean share of capital (i.e., total fixed assets) across industries is 0.41 in the organized sector 
versus 0.31 in the unorganized sector. These differences may reflect differences in access to 
capital or other conditions that determine the operation of establishments in both sectors. They 
may also capture specialization in different segments of these industries. Regardless of their 
origin, these differences are large enough that we want to estimate productivity allowing for 
factor coefficients to differ across sectors for the same industry.  
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A large majority of industries appear in Table 2 to operate under increasing returns, since the 
sum of the employment and capital coefficients often exceeds one. This is not an artefact of our 
estimation technique. Similar results are obtained when productivity is estimated with OLS 
techniques and modeling these two factors of production or separating the main components of 
capital: land, buildings, and other fixed assets. Measuring increasing returns in the ability of 
establishments to generate revenue is puzzling as we expect most establishments to face only 
imperfectly elastic demand. We believe two phenomena are at work. First, they could partly 
reflect true increasing returns faced by all establishments that are constrained by frictions and 
cannot reach their optimal size. Measured increasing returns could also reflect frictions that 
systematically affect larger and more productive establishments. For instance, strict labor 
regulations may affect large establishments more than small ones (e.g., Banerjee and Moll, 
2010), so that large and more productive plants employ relatively fewer workers. This type of 
phenomena could then lead to coefficients on factors of production that are biased upwards in 
productivity estimations. That is, while plants operate under constant or decreasing returns in 
reality, it may look like they operate under increasing returns as more productive establishments 
use relatively fewer factors. Regressions could attribute differences across establishments to 
differences in factor usage, making factors look more productive than they really are.  
 
We thus face the empirical challenge that we need to know establishment productivity in order to 
measure frictions in factor allocation across establishments. At the same time, these same 
frictions can distort measures of establishment productivity. To address with this problem, we 
duplicate our results using productivity estimates that impose constant returns to scale.  
 
More generally, our main need here is to obtain the best possible estimate for productivity at the 
establishment level. For this, we focus on the LP-Sivadasan approach. We also experiment 
satisfactorily with OLS approaches to ensure robustness and to model more flexible functional 
forms that can consider more factors of production (e.g., break down total fixed assets into land, 
buildings, and other fixed assets). When we estimate OLS TFP with three factors of production 
(land and buildings, capital, and employment), the average coefficient on land and building is 
0.13 and the average coefficient on other fixed assets is 0.28 in the organized sector. These two 
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coefficients sum to 0.41 which is the same as the average coefficient on TFP with our main LP 
estimation. When we distinguish between land and buildings, the average coefficients are 0.04 
on land, 0.11 on buildings, and 0.27 on other fixed assets. These coefficients sum to just above 
0.41. These elasticities of establishment value added with respect to land and buildings are used 
below to assess the effects of increased factor availability. 
 
Figures 2a and 2b represent our TFP estimates averaged by district for the organized sector and 
unorganized sector, respectively. Like the earlier maps of output per worker, these two maps 
reveal a strong contrast between the more productive western parts of the country and the less 
productive eastern areas. These two maps also again show areas of higher productivity around 
India’s largest metropolitan areas, most notably Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Delhi. 
Although a full development or growth accounting exercise is beyond the scope of our study, a 
comparison of these figures is suggestive that India’s spatial disparities in output per worker are 
to some extent productivity disparities. There is no correlation between the organized and 
unorganized sectors with respect to district-level TFP. 
 
3.5 Some descriptive facts about misallocation in India 
 
Figures 3a and 3b provide maps of our preferred misallocation index for land and buildings in 
the organized and unorganized sector, respectively. Darker colors indicate greater misallocation. 
Both sectors display a negative correlation between output per worker and misallocation. The 
more misallocated districts in the northeast, south, and interior are all districts with low output 
per worker. The next section documents and quantifies these relationships more precisely. 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for indices of misallocation for Indian districts. We report 
statistics for the full manufacturing sector, followed by breakouts of the organized and 
unorganized sectors. A number of features are worth highlighting. Recalling that higher index 
values indicate greater misallocation, we estimate less value-added misallocation in panel A 
when considering the full manufacturing sector than when considering each sector 
independently. This is not surprising given the high concentration of output in the organized 
22 
 
sector and its more productive establishments. Combining the organized and unorganized 
distributions increases the correlation of these output shares and productivity.   
 
These district-level indices for misallocation of output and value added are reasonable compared 
to prior literature. Bartelsman et al. (2009) compute overall input misallocation indices for 18 
countries at different levels of economic development. For the sake of comparison we compute 
an average input factor misallocation index for the full manufacturing sector, weighting indices 
of factor input misallocation by their average share in production. Despite some computational 
differences with Bartelsman et al. (2009), these indices are roughly comparable. The mean over 
1989-2010 for Indian districts is about -0.33. This is marginally worse than the United States (as 
a whole) calculated by Bartelsman et al. (2009). More generally, Indian districts are less 
misallocated than the majority of the 18 countries considered by Bartelsman et al. (2009).    
 
The second key feature of table 3 is the considerable variation of misallocation across districts. 
The standard deviations for the indices of misallocation for output and value added are two-
thirds of their levels for the full manufacturing sector in panel A. For the organized sector, the 
mean and standard deviation are comparable. This suggests considerable differences in 
misallocation within India, a fact not previously documented by the literature. The differences in 
misallocation within India are even larger than the differences across countries estimated by 
Bartelsman et al. (2009). The difference between the country with the lowest misallocation and 
that with the highest in their data is about 0.7. This corresponds to about 1.3 standard deviations 
for misallocation of value added in the full manufacturing sector of India, and 1.6 standard 
deviations in the organized sector. 
 
A third key feature in table 3 is the extreme misallocation of individual factors of production, 
which contrasts with the lower levels of misallocation of output and value added. While the 
average 1989-2010 misallocation of output is -0.71 for the organized sector, it is only -0.27 for 
employment and -0.33 for buildings and land. The levels are even lower for each sector 
individually at approximately -0.1 for land and building factors.  
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Recall that zero values correspond to a situation where factor allocation is orthogonal to 
productivity. Hence, while more productive establishments manage to produce more than less 
productive establishments, allocations of some factors of production are barely better than 
random. Given the large variation in factor misallocation across districts, this actually indicates 
that there are many districts in India where factor allocation is worse than random. This troubling 
feature is vividly illustrated by figures 3a and 3b, where land and building misallocation indices 
are positive in about 40% of the districts.  
 
Three candidate explanations exist for this gap between the indices of misallocation for output 
and value added and similar indices for individual factors of production. The first is that the data 
measure output much better than factors. While it is perhaps relatively easy for an establishment 
to know what its revenue is, it may be much harder to know what its capital is. This argument, 
however, could work in the opposite direction as it is not immediately obvious whether it is 
output or labor that is better measured. There is also an incentive for firms to hide output more 
than factors of production. 
 
The second explanation is that even if factors are allocated equally across establishments (or at 
random), we still expect more productive establishments to produce more output. As argued 
above, vast differences in establishment productivity (e.g., due to managerial skill) may then 
explain why a reasonably low level of misallocation of output can co-exist with extreme factor 
misallocation. The important counterpart to this statement is that improvements in factor 
allocation may yield large output gains. We return to this issue below. Finally, we also need to 
keep in mind that a highly productive establishment with little land may be able to offset this by 
being particularly intensive in employment or in other forms of capital. For now, we only 
consider the covariance between factors and productivity but not how factors co-vary.  
 
Finally, two more subtle patterns also emerge from table 3. First, the misallocation of 
employment and land is worse than the misallocation of buildings (when it can be separated from 
land) and other fixed assets. Second, there appears to be a mild trend towards a worsening output 
and factor misallocation over time. 
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As we turn to our regression analyses, our focus will be on the total misallocation in the 
manufacturing sector. At times, we will describe results that consider variation just within the 
organized or unorganized sectors. Similar to Table 3, it is important to highlight that the results 
for the combined sample will not be an average of these sector-level results. This is because the 
full sample also accounts for the fact that the frictions at the root of factor misallocation will 
affect whether an establishment belongs to the organized or the unorganized sector. It further 
captures the size of productivity differences between the sectors and their relationship to 
establishment scale.4   
 
4. Validation of misallocation metrics 
 
While a number of studies calculate and compare metrics of misallocation, there has been limited 
scope to validate them. An advantage of our focus on factor misallocation—and in particular 
land misallocation—is that we can demonstrate their general validity/usefulness by studying 
changes in district-level misallocation around two important policy reforms in India: the repeal 
of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and changes in state-level stamp duties (taxes on 
land sales). This section shows that reforms that reduced frictions in the functioning of land 
markets are associated with a reduction in the misallocation of land (and also output). 
 
Our empirical strategies are differences-in-differences estimations around policy changes. While 
our emphasis is mostly on the validation of our metrics, the empirical connection of land 
misallocation to policy determinants is interesting in its own right and worthy of close study. The 
ULCRA reform has the advantage of being unanticipated, and in our analyses we control for 
trends in many other local traits that could be correlated with policy adoption. We are cautious to 
note that other factors or policies might be adjusting alongside those that we study, and these 
unobserved factors could impact our results in terms of the likely impact of a policy reform. For 
                                                          
4 The following extreme example helps form intuition. Consider a situation where more productive establishments 
are either unaffected by frictions or completely crippled by them (i.e., frictions prevent them from hiring more than 
10 workers). Whether a more productive establishment is affected is random. In this extreme case, there is no 
misallocation in the upper part of the employment distribution (i.e., in the organised sector) since only productive 
establishments unaffected by frictions are represented. On the other hand, establishments with low employment (i.e., 
in the unorganised sector) will either be constrained productive establishments and unconstrained poorly productive 
establishments. Measured misallocation will be extremely low in the organised sector and high in the unorganised 
sector. Combining the two sectors together will also yield a misallocation worse than any sector individually. 
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our core focus, observing these strong linkages of our misallocation indices to frictions thought 
to reduce allocative efficiency provides greater confidence in our measurement design and their 
useful for quantifying the role of factor misallocation. 
 
4.1. The repeal of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 
 
In 1976, the parliament of India enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (ULCRA) 
with the main objective of limiting the concentration of urban land. ULCRA imposed ceiling 
limits for holdings of vacant land, prohibited transfers of land and buildings, and restricted 
building construction in 64 of the largest urban agglomerations (central cities and their suburbs). 
More specifically, this regulation distinguished between four groups of cities. It applied to all of 
the largest cities and other cities with population larger than 200,000 in 1971 in 17 states and 
three UTs. Because the regulation applied to both ownership and ‘possession’ of land, it 
constrained both owners and renters (lessees). ULCRA further imposed potentially draconian 
penalties to offenders, including the destruction of newly built properties or the forced purchase 
of properties by the government at a symbolic price. Kimura (2013) describes how these 
regulations severely constrained the operations of the land and property markets in areas where 
ULCRA applied. 
 
Despite the intentions of parliament, there is little empirical evidence that the equity objectives 
of ULCRA were fulfilled (Sridhar, 2010). In fact, the law artificially restricted the supply of 
urban land (e.g., by freezing large areas of land in legal dispute), bid up land prices, and 
encouraged corruption (Joshi and Little, 1991; Bertaud, 2002). Importantly, ULCRA also 
prevented private developers from assembling land for subsequent development. For almost a 
quarter century, ULCRA practically halted legal development of land by the private sector in 
urban areas unless exemptions were obtained (Srinivas, 1991). The regulation and market 
constraints reduced the incentives of landholders to invest in building construction. Thus, a large 
proportion of firms were both land and building constrained by way of ULCRA. 
 
In 1999, the Repeal Act gave rights to state governments of India to repeal ULCRA. The 
ULCRA reform was mostly anticipated. A number of states and UTs repealed ULCRA by 2003, 
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including Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh. By contrast, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Maharashtra, and West Bengal kept 
ULCRA effective until 2008.5  
 
To assess the effects of the repeal of ULCRA on misallocation, we estimate a series of 
regressions where we consider the district-level change in misallocation from 2000 to 2010 as 
the dependent variable. Our key explanatory variable is an indicator variable for states that 
repealed ULCRA early, as listed above. We consider the set of late adopters to be the control 
group as repeals in 2008 are unlikely to have substantial consequences by 2010, especially for 
ASI establishments surveyed in 2009-10. Estimations are unweighted cross-sectional regressions 
that include 252 Indian districts. We cluster standard errors by state to represent the state-level 
choices being made to repeal ULCRA. 
 
𝑀𝑖,2010
𝐿 −𝑀𝑖,2000
𝐿 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖
𝑈𝐿𝐶𝑅𝐴 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
 
Two main estimation worries are that the repeal of ULCRA may have coincided with other 
district features that affected misallocation and that the initial sample of ULCRA districts may 
have been highly selected in a way that affects the results. To minimize these worries, we include 
a number of control variables X. The most essential is the initial level of misallocation. This is 
important because districts where ULCRA applied may have experienced greater misallocation 
in 2000. We also have a battery of additional controls for the initial traits of districts (e.g., 
population density, local demographics, local infrastructure traits) as listed in the notes to table 4.  
 
Table 4 reports our main results for the effect of the repeal of ULCRA. Panel A considers 
misallocation of land and buildings as the outcome variable. We focus on estimations that 
consider the full manufacturing sector, combining the organized and unorganized sectors 
together. The negative coefficient indicates that the early state-level repeal of ULCRA is 
associated with a stronger decline in land and building misallocation during 2000 to 2010 
                                                          
5 The negative effect of ULCRA is still evident in the land use patterns of Mumbai, many years after ULCRA was 
abrogated by the State of Maharashtra in 2007 (Bertaud, 2011). Siddiqi (2013) provides an in-depth analysis of the 
political economy of ULCRA adoption and its repeal in Mumbai (Maharashtra). With the repeal of ULCRA in 1999, 
about 25,000 acres of land have been freed. However, only 10,000 of these are in developable zones, while the 
remaining 15,000 fall in areas with restrictions—such as coastal zones and forest lands (Sridhar, 2010). 
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compared to late adopters. The 0.057 coefficient is quite substantial and represents about one-
tenth of a standard deviation of land and building misallocation. Using results later reported in 
Table 7, the 0.057 decrease in misallocation for land and buildings of associated with the repeal 
of ULCRA corresponds to an increase in output per worker of about 3.7%. 
 
Panel b considers the change in misallocation for value added for districts. ULCRA is associated 
with reduced misallocation on this dimension as well. In fact, it appears the declines may have 
been greater here than on land and buildings in economic terms. In terms of standard deviations, 
the ULCRA repeal is associated with a decline of about one-fifth of a standard deviation in value 
added. This larger impact may seem puzzling to start, but it is quite possible under the scenarios 
highlighted above where improved factor allocation is magnified by inherent differences in 
establishment productivity (e.g., better land access is amplified by a capable manager). Current 
research is also considering whether the improved functioning of land and property markets aids 
in other factor acquisition through improved property rights and borrowing conditions. As 
suggestive evidence, unreported analyses find the allocation of other fixed assets also improved 
with ULCRA’s repeal.  
 
Column 2 shows this result is robust to adjustments in the covariates modeled, although the basic 
controls are important for the statistical precision with which we can measure ULCRA’s effect 
due to many other changes underway in India during this period. Columns 3-6 show that these 
results are quite robust to variations in methodology. We show similar findings when 
misallocation is computed without aggregating first by industry, when using OLS estimates of 
productivity, when weighting districts by initial employment, and when following the HK 
approach. The results are actually stronger statistically than our primary metrics in column 1. 
The point estimates of the coefficients are not directly comparable due to the different scales and 
variances of the metrics. The results are also robust to different approaches towards extreme 
values like winsorization. 
 
Unreported estimations consider misallocation in distributions specific to the organized and 
unorganized sectors. The repeal of ULCRA is more closely associated with reduced 
misallocation for factors in the unorganized sector than the organized sector: the unorganized 
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sector coefficient is -0.035 (se=0.021), which represents again a tenth of a standard deviation for 
the sector. Yet, it is quite clear overall that the major impact of ULCRA came less from changes 
in misallocation within each sector vs. changes in the relative sizes of sectors and their joint 
distribution for misallocation. As one example, the log change in the value of land and buildings 
in the organized sector with ULCRA’s repeal is 0.722 (se=0.261) for the organized sector, 
compared to 0.420 (se=0.197) for the unorganized sector. These relative changes in factor 
allocations across sectors appear to have been more central for the reductions in misallocation 
compared to changes within sectors.  
 
4.2 Stamp duty 
 
High stamp duties are another trait of Indian property markets.6 These taxes are collected 
whenever a real property is transacted. While these taxes are between zero and 5% in most North 
American jurisdictions, they tend to be much higher in India. There is also a lot of variation 
across states and time. For instance, the lowest rate is found in Tripura at 5%, while the highest 
rate of 21.2% was in West Bengal early in our period of study. West Bengal dramatically 
lowered its stamp duty, reaching 5% in 2003. These taxes represent an important friction and 
have received some academic attention outside of India, affecting for example the Canadian 
housing market by lowering prices and the number of transactions (e.g., Dachis et al., 2012). 
 
High stamp duties impose high compliance costs on taxpayers and lead to widespread avoidance 
through under-reporting (Alm et al, 2004; Morris and Pandey, 2009). This in turn adversely 
affects the possibility of using land as collateral for construction financing. High stamp duties 
also discourage land transactions, and as a consequence reduce the supply of land on the market. 
High stamp duties are thought to be at the root of a $3.4 billion scam on the use of fraudulent 
stamp papers by Abdul Karim Telgi that was reported in India in 2002.  
 
                                                          
6 Stamp duties in India are imposed under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended several times over the years at 
the central government level. Under these central acts, each state has the authority to enact its own stamp duties, so 
that the specific features of the stamp duties, while broadly similar across the states, also take on state-specific 
characteristics. Within the broad definition of stamp duties imposed on sale and purchase of business transactions, 
including property, there are two sub-classifications: (i) Judicial stamp duty is usually a small fee collected by the 
court for litigation purposes, and (ii) Non-judicial stamp duty is a onetime charge on the transfer of immovable 
property based on the value of the transaction. 
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Table 5 uses a long-differenced estimation similar to Table 4 to consider the relationship 
between changes in stamp duties at the state level and local misallocation. We consider changes 
in misallocation from 1989 to 2010 as the outcome variable, with changes in stamp duties from 
1989 to 2003 as the core explanatory variable. We again control for initial misallocation and the 
traits of districts. 
 
Panel A of column 1 shows that an increase in stamp duties at the state level is associated with 
rising misallocation for land and buildings during the period of study. To provide a sense of 
magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the change in stamp duties is associated with a 
one-tenth of a standard deviation increase in misallocation of land and buildings. Panel B shows 
a very similar result for changes in value-added misallocation, and these results are generally 
robust across columns 2-6. Inclusion or exclusion of district covariates does not impact these 
results nor their statistical precision. The one exception is that we do not observe a decline in the 
HK metric of misallocation with this reform. 
 
Similar to our ULCRA analysis, we have explored variations within the organized and 
unorganized sectors in isolation. Higher stamp duties are associated with more misallocation of 
value added and land and buildings for establishments in the organized sector. The economic 
magnitudes for the organized sector are similar to that for the manufacturing sector overall at 
about one-tenth of standard deviation. Higher stamp duties are not associated with significant 
change in misallocation among establishments in the unorganized sector. Similar to ULCRA, 
much of the action appears to come through changes in the relative sizes of the two sectors and 
their joint distributions (e.g., lower stamp duties allow more productive establishments in the 
organized sector to differentially expand). While these numbers should be taken with proper 
caution given the caveats noted earlier, they suggest potentially large frictions caused by nearly 
punitive taxes on the transfer of a fundamentally important asset.  
 
5.3 Local characteristics 
 
As a related exercise, although perhaps more mundane than studying policy adjustments, we 
ascertain that the traits of districts that correlate to our misallocation indices make intuitive 
30 
 
sense. Unreported analyses evaluate which of the control variables used in tables 4-5 most 
closely relate to factor and output misallocation. Rather than wade through an exhausting set of 
tables, the following discussion summarizes a large number of regressions. 
 
We explore the urban dimension by regressing misallocation on various measures of urban scale, 
mostly population density and total population. We find some interesting patterns, with district 
population and district density yielding similar results. There is a negative association of 
population with misallocation of value added in the organized sector, no effect in the 
unorganized sector, and a positive effect when both sectors are combined. This is consistent with 
urban scale reducing misallocation in the organized sector but also leading to a larger 
unorganized sector where misallocation is greater. For the misallocation of land and buildings, 
the coefficients of the urban variables are generally positive, perhaps consistent with the notion 
that frictions in the land and property markets are more important in larger cities.7  
 
A limitation to these results is that their statistical significance often disappears when many more 
control variables are added. At the same time, it is well-known that productivity and output per 
worker are higher in larger and denser cities. The literature usually attributes the productivity 
advantage of cities to agglomeration economies. Our results suggest that agglomeration 
economies are not directly caused by reduced misallocation in larger cities, a result consistent 
with the findings of Combes et al. (2012) for France.  
 
We also consider the effects of relative location, accessibility, and roads. We only find weak 
indications that the misallocations of value added and land and building decrease with a higher 
composite index of infrastructure (e.g., paved roads, telecom access, sanitation/water). We also 
find some effects associated with the distance to the major cities, but they go in opposite 
direction. Interestingly, state-level fixed effects can have important explanatory power. India is a 
federation, and institutions and policies differ across states. Consistent with our policy results 
above, these differences affect misallocation levels.  
 
                                                          
7 Interestingly for firms in the organised sector where we can distinguish between land and buildings, the 
coefficients on our measures of urban scale are negative for buildings and positive for land.  
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Finally, misallocation is negatively correlated with many proxies for development and local 
wealth such as access to banking, the fraction of scheduled castes and tribes in the local 
population, the male-female sex ratio, or access to power. It is difficult with our data to assess 
whether these are causal effects or merely correlations. For instance, one can easily imagine why 
a more limited access to banking and the financial system could worsen misallocation through 
credit constraints. At the same time, it is also possible that the same institutional features that 
drive misallocation also limit the presence of the financial sector. Either way, similar to the two 
policy reforms that we studied, we gain confidence in our metrics when observing these 
reasonable connections to other local district traits.  
 
5. Consequences of misallocation 
 
Having considered the validity/usefulness of the factor misallocation metrics, we now turn to 
how different forms of misallocation interact at the district level. We also quantify the 
relationship of local misallocation to productivity. 
 
5.1 How different forms of misallocation interact 
 
We study how forms of misallocation interact in the cross-section and also dynamically. We start 
by measuring the extent to which the misallocations of factors of production explain the 
contemporaneous misallocation of output and value added. These exercises consider both cross-
sectional relationships and panel co-movements. We then ask whether the misallocation of 
factors of production in one period has a dynamic effect on the future misallocation of output or 
value added (e.g., high land misallocation leading to worsening output misallocation). 
 
To answer the first set of questions, we regress the index of misallocation for output or value 
added on the corresponding factor misallocation indices. These regressions take the form: 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑌 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 + 𝑎2𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑇&𝐵 + 𝑎3𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝐴 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
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where the misallocation of output in districts i and year t is regressed on the misallocation of 
employment, the misallocation of land and buildings, the misallocation of other fixed assets, a 
vector of year fixed effects, and an error term. Estimations cluster standard errors by district. 
  
Table 6a reports the results. Estimations in panel A are unweighted district-year observations, 
while estimations in panel B weight districts by their initial 1989 employment levels. Column 1 
considers our benchmark estimation that combines the organized and unorganized sectors, 
includes three factors of production, and considers misallocation of value added as the outcome 
variable. The relationships are quite powerful, with all forms of factor misallocation contributing 
to the misallocation of value added. Land and building misallocation is particularly important, 
with a one standard deviation increase in that factor’s misallocation corresponding to a 0.6 
standard deviation increase in value-added misallocation. In economic terms, land and building 
misallocation is the most important explanatory factor, with the misallocation of other fixed 
assets being the weakest (its coefficient is 0.00039 (se=0.00005)). A one standard deviation 
increase in employment misallocation corresponds to a 0.4 standard deviation increase in value-
added misallocation. 
 
Going into more detail, the larger coefficient on land and buildings compared to employment is 
striking for two reasons. First, there is greater cross-district variation in the misallocation of land 
and buildings than for employment or fixed assets, as reported in Table 3. We are thus finding a 
particularly strong coefficient on the factor with the greatest variability, per the economic 
interpretations given above. Second, recall that the elasticity of value added with respect to land 
and buildings is only about 0.13, whereas the elasticity of value added with respect to 
employment is 0.66 on average across industries in the organized sector. Hence, even though the 
land and buildings factor accounts for a small fraction of final output and value added, it plays a 
disproportionate role in explaining the misallocation of final output. On the other hand, the 
misallocation of other capital appears to account for very little of the misallocation of final 
output. Column 2 shows similar results when combing the two forms of fixed assets together. 
 
To assess the robustness of these results, we perform a number of checks. Column 3 finds similar 
results when further adding district fixed effects to focus on panel variation. Unreported analyses 
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also find very similar outcomes when modeling state fixed effects. In both cases, the 
relationships are usually statistically undistinguishable from our base estimation. 
 
Columns 4-6 show variations on the calculation of misallocation. Column 4 yields slightly 
smaller magnitudes when calculating misallocation indices directly across establishments from 
all sectors, without allowing for industry production differences. This is consistent with the 
notion that ignoring the industry dimension will lead to greater mis-measurement of factor 
misallocation, but as important the gaps are quite small. Unreported analyses also find very 
similar results in variations that use national industry weights instead of local shares, ignore 
sectors but normalize factor usage by the inverse of the estimated factor shares, and so forth. 
Column 5 also shows similar results using OLS TFP metrics, and we also obtain similar results 
with other productivity estimation approaches. Column 6 shows robust results when using 
misallocation of output as the dependent variable rather than misallocation of value added. 
 
While we should be cautious and refrain from any structural interpretation, these results shed an 
interesting light on misallocation in Indian manufacturing. The fairly high R-squared values for 
the regressions of table 6a are also interesting and suggestive of the importance of factor 
misallocation for accounting for the frequently discussed misallocation of output. Finally, we 
should keep in mind that these results are all the more striking since these indices are likely to be 
mis-measured. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that land (and to a lesser 
extent employment) is the least flexible factor of production and that its misallocation likely 
breeds the misallocations of other factors and output.8  
 
Unreported analyses separate the organized and unorganized sectors. While our focus is on the 
combined misallocation that includes effects within both sectors and their relative sizes, it is 
again intriguing to isolate variation within each group. Results in both sectors are statistically 
significant with magnitudes for the organized and unorganized sectors of about 0.30 and 0.55, 
respectively. For both sectors, the standard deviation of the value-added misallocation index is 
                                                          
8 Recall that the share of employment in production is more than four times as high as the share of land and 
buildings and employment is about as poorly misallocated as land and buildings. Hence, should the misallocation of 
land and buildings be the same as that of employment with the two being independent, we would expect a much 
larger coefficient for employment misallocation in the regressions of table 6a. 
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comparable to the standard deviation of the land and building misallocation index, so these 
figures are comparable and indicate a somewhat higher importance for the informal sector of 
land misallocation.  
 
To assess whether factor misallocation has dynamic implications for the misallocation of output 
and value added, we regress changes in output or value added misallocation from 1989 to 2010 
on the initial levels of misallocation for factors in 1989. These estimations take the form: 
 
𝑀𝑖,2010
𝑌 −𝑀𝑖,1989
𝑌 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑖,1989
𝑌 + 𝑎2𝑀𝑖,1989
𝐿 + 𝑎3𝑀𝑖,1989
𝑇&𝐵 + 𝑎4𝑀𝑖,1989
𝑂𝐴 + 𝜖𝑖 
 
Because changes in the misallocation of output or value added are likely to be poorly measured, 
we also control for the initial value of misallocation of output or value added. 
 
Table 6b reports the results. There is considerable evidence for mean reversion in misallocation 
over time, but it is unfortunately not possible to tell how much of this is caused by true mean 
reversion versus measurement error. Panel A of table 6b also shows that initial factor 
misallocation has only small and relatively fragile effects on future changes in value added 
misallocation in unweighted estimations. By contrast, panel B finds a much stronger connection 
when weighting districts by their initial size. This difference may indicate economic 
consequences from land misallocation that are particularly concentrated in larger initial centers 
of manufacturing activity, or the stronger results may reflect reduced measurement error when 
focusing on places with more plants in 1989 to calculate misallocation. These connections 
strengthen in our variations reported in Column 2-6. 
 
To summarize, we find that factor misallocation explains output misallocation. Land and 
buildings appear to play a particularly important role in this respect. Our findings regarding the 
dynamic implication of factor misallocation are more mixed but suggestive that misallocation of 
land and employment today may worsen the misallocation of output or value added in the future.  
 
5.2 Effects of misallocation on output per worker and productivity 
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We now turn to the effects of factor misallocation on output per worker. We think of factor 
allocation as a proximate cause that explains output per worker in Indian districts. In turn, factor 
allocation is determined by a number of ‘deeper’ determinants, similar to our earlier policy 
analyses. By analogy with the empirical growth literature, this exercise should be thought more 
as growth accounting (Caselli, 2005) or in the spirit of the early cross-country growth regressions 
looking at proximate factors of growth (Barro, 1991). 
 
More specifically, we estimate regressions of the following form:  
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 + 𝑎2𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑇&𝐵 + 𝑎3𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝐴 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where the dependent variable is now output per worker in district i in year t. The explanatory 
variables are again various measures of factor misallocation and year fixed effects. In some 
robustness checks, we also introduce state or district fixed effects. However, we do not consider 
further determinants of output per worker. For instance, we suspect that a larger population or a 
better access to infrastructure boost output per worker in India, as has been identified elsewhere. 
These determinants of output per worker are also likely to influence factor misallocation. This 
said, attempting to estimate the ‘pure’ effect of factor misallocation may not make much sense. 
Deeper determinants of output per worker will affect output per worker through a variety of 
channels, including factor misallocation. When assessing proximate factors of output per worker, 
it is not appropriate to include deeper determinants.   
 
Table 7 reports our main results in the same format as the earlier work. For the combined sample 
in column 1, the coefficient on the misallocation of land and buildings is large in absolute value 
at -0.645. By contrast, there is no connection to the misallocation of employment, and the impact 
of the misallocation of other fixed assets is negative and statistically significant, but extremely 
small. Similar conclusions are reached in other specifications, including the introduction of 
district fixed effects in Column 3 that focus on panel variation in the data. 
 
Land and buildings misallocation is associated with a reduced labor productivity in both sectors 
of manufacturing (organized sector coefficient is -0.428 (se=0.097), unorganized sector 
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coefficient is -0.279 (se=0.109)), with employment misallocation being extremely important for 
the unorganized sector, far exceeding the role of land and buildings. We also examined the HK 
misallocation index. This measure relies on the variance of estimated productivity within each 
district and is not tied to a particular factor. Unreported analyses regress output per worker on 
this summary measure of misallocation and yield a coefficient of -0.757 for the organized sector, 
-1.535 for the unorganized sector, and -1.685 for the combined sample. These three coefficients 
are highly statistically significant, and the R-squared values are similar to those obtained with 
our core approach. On the other hand, we do not observe a systematic relationship between labor 
productivity growth and initial land and building misallocation.  
 
The results of table 7 suggest fairly large effects associated with factor misallocation. For the full 
manufacturing sector, a standard deviation in the misallocation of land and buildings represents 
about a 25% reduction in output per worker. These effects are sizeable, and they grow modestly 
as other forms of misallocation are also considered. We also find very similar magnitudes when 
using the HK metric. Factor misallocation appears to affect the unorganized sector more, perhaps 
because it affects smaller firms more or because it forces more productive establishments into the 
unorganized sector. More important, the overall effect of factor misallocation on the two sectors 
is larger than its effects on either sub-sector in isolation due to its impact on their relative sizes 
and joint distribution. 
 
We can compare the effects of a better factor allocation with the effects of an increase in the 
supply of factors. In the organized sector, recall that the coefficient on land and buildings in the 
production function is 0.13. Hence, a doubling of land and buildings made available for 
manufacturing activities would imply a 9% increase in output. While a doubling in 
manufacturing land and buildings seems like a large increase, recall that the supply of land in 
India is extremely constrained, and particularly so for manufacturing activity. By contrast, we 
estimate a one standard deviation reduction in land and building misallocation is associated with 
a 25% increase in output per worker. To match this effect, the supply of land and buildings 
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would need to increase more than six-fold. While there are gains from expanding the supply of 
land, the gains from a better factor allocation are perhaps even larger.9,10   
 
Although our approach is novel, we can also roughly compare our results with those of Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009). While this comparison is somewhat of a stretch, it is instructive. When 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use their model to compare output for actual Indian manufacturing 
during 1998-2005 period in a hypothetical Indian economy where factors would be perfectly 
efficiently allocated, they find a difference of about 100%. That is, they calculate that 
eliminating misallocation completely from Indian manufacturing would lead to a doubling of 
output per worker. If India was brought the same level of efficiency as the United States, they 
compute a gain of still about 50%. Relative to our findings, the calculations of Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) appear to understate the potential gains from better factor allocation. Ballpark estimates 
for the organized sector in 2000 suggest that moving from a median level of misallocation to the 
top decile—arguably still well below perfect efficiency and most likely well below the U.S. 
average—is associated with a 50% increase in output per worker. These very large numbers do 
not even consider the potential gains from reallocating factors from the less productive 
unorganized sector to the more productive organized sector nor do they consider the gains from 
reallocating factors from less productive districts to more productive districts.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Our exploration of the impact of land and building misallocation across Indian districts yields a 
rich set of findings, which we summarize in four basic groups.  
 First, and very important from a methodological perspective, we validate the usefulness 
of misallocation indices for land and building inputs at the district level through 
                                                          
9 As a second point of comparison, moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of districts in terms of efficiency in 
the use of land and buildings is associated with more than a 50% increase in output per worker. For a district in 
India, a 50% increase in output per worker corresponds to moving from the 20th percentile of the distribution of 
output per worker to about the median.   
10 While a reduction in the misallocation of inputs and an increase in their supply should be conceptually 
distinguished, in practice, many policies appear to affect both. For instance, we show that ULCRA worsened the 
misallocation of land and buildings where it applied. It is also widely argued that ULCRA restricted the supply of 
land and buildings.     
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evaluations of local policy changes like the unanticipated ULCRA repeal and stamp duty 
changes.  
 Second, we provide novel statistics about the importance and severity of Indian factor 
misallocation. The misallocation of factor inputs is substantially worse than the 
misallocation of outputs. While more productive establishments produce more in India, 
they are often doing so in environments with factor allocations that are as good as 
random and sometimes even worse. Indeed, the variation in the misallocation of factor 
inputs across India districts is of the same magnitude as the variation in the misallocation 
of factor inputs measured by Bartelsman et al. (2009) for 18 countries of the world.  
 Third, a higher misallocation of inputs is closely connected to a greater misallocation of 
output. These relationships are evident in cross-section levels for districts and panel 
adjustments over time. Land and buildings, which are arguably the most fixed of assets, 
appear to play a particularly important role in driving the misallocation of output. Initial 
land and building misallocation for India in 1989 can forward predict future increases in 
the misallocation of output. 
 Finally, misallocation has important implications in terms of productive efficiency. A 
standard deviation in the misallocation of land and buildings is associated with a 25% 
difference in output per worker. These effects are seemingly even larger than those 
predicted by extant models. We estimate a one standard deviation improvement in land 
and building misallocation would have an output boost equal to a six-fold increase in land 
supply.  
   
While these results are provocative, more remains to be explored. Continuing first with our 
district-level focus, we see four key areas for future work.  
 One is to further refine the connections of the misallocation of each input factor with the 
overall misallocation of output. This extension of the Olley-Pakes methodology will 
provide a sharper sense of relative input frictions and the areas upon which policy should 
focus. Likewise, we have provided in this paper accounts of changes within the organized 
and unorganized sectors, relative to the whole. We are seeking to build a formal 
decomposition of the relative changes in these components and their joint positions. 
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 Second, this paper demonstrates the reasonable connection of land and building 
misallocation indices with the reforms impacting these inputs, and we hope to extend this 
to a similar consideration for labor inputs, which is of potentially overwhelming 
importance given that it accounts for a very large share of output. To assess the effects of 
policies on the misallocation of labor, we plan to use changes in labor regulation that took 
place in the late 1980s and early 1990s compiled by Besley and Burgess (2008) and the 
dismantling of the Raj Licence system during the early 1990s (Aghion et al., 2008) as our 
main sources of variation.   
 A third vein investigates whether land misallocation is amplified and entrenched by 
causing misallocation in other inputs to firms. This paper finds that land misallocation is 
the greater among equals in terms of input misallocation, but it does not examine the 
propagation channels or aggregated effects that it creates. We seek to specifically 
investigate this feedback loop in terms of financial misallocation. The development of 
well-functioning banking and capital markets is an important step for economic growth. 
Most bank loans require some form of collateral to be provided to guarantee the loan. 
Land is simply the best form of collateral possible due to its immobility (the debtor 
cannot run off with land) and its high rate of re-usability in other contexts besides its 
current form. Thus, an important hypothesis to be investigated is that land misallocation 
breeds local misallocation of bank loans. 
 A final, clear extension is to understand misallocation in other sectors like services. 
 
In addition, it is also very important to connect these within-district findings to large differences 
in misallocation across districts and how they aggregate to national misallocation. Our analysis 
treats each district in isolation, which has several implications. One consequence is that we 
naturally miss the role of cross-district variation in factor allocations for explaining the aggregate 
misallocation of output that studies frequently consider. This may be of substantial importance 
for India given the historical constraints placed on business location choices and industrial 
policies that sought broad-based regional participation. We need to better understand these 
between- vs. within-district components to enable richer accounting exercises and to document 
more clearly the statistical and economic inference made with panel data from districts. We are 
seeking to extend the Olley-Pakes decomposition in this direction, and we will need to consider 
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its properties relative to other widely used forms like Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Knowing the 
within/between breakdown of misallocation is important since the policy tools to target both 
types of misallocation are likely to differ. For instance, further integration of financial markets 
within India or a reduction in the cost of migration between areas will likely affect misallocation 
(of capital and labor) across places first and foremost. Other policies such as a relaxation of the 
strict zoning policies in some Indian cities such as Mumbai are, on the other hand, expected to 
improve the efficiency of factor allocation in those areas where these regulations are the most 
binding. 
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Appendix A. Land issues in India 
 
Efficient use of land is critically dependent on necessary institutions, such as a transparent 
system to convert land use, a clear definition of property rights, a robust system of land and 
property valuation, and a strong judicial system for addressing public concerns to facilitate land 
markets, land transactions, and land use changes. India, however, faces serious shortcomings on 
all fronts.  
 
Land use and the intensity of land development are severely restricted. Everywhere, there are 
severe restrictions on the transition of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use. This limits 
urban expansion. Zoning also imposes constraints within cities where obsolete land uses are 
often maintained. For instance, old cotton mills still occupy large areas of land in central 
Mumbai and Ahmedabad (Bertaud, 2002). 
 
There are also extremely restrictive regulations in urban areas imposing ceilings on building 
heights and maximum floor space index (FSI) levels. FSI in India is seldom above 1.6 which is 
very low when compared to values ranging from 5 to 15 in other cities of Asia. Low FSIs 
increase the demand for land as more land is required to build a given area of floor space. In 
turn, this leads to higher property prices. Low FSIs also have a negative impact on the spatial 
structure of cities. By unreasonably reducing the amount of floor space that can be built in 
centrally located areas, and by making land recycling difficult, some regulations tend to “push” 
urban development toward the periphery. As a result, commuting trips become longer, public 
transport becomes difficult to operate, and urban infrastructure has to be extended further than 
what would have been the case if land supply had been unconstrained (Bertaud and Brueckner, 
2005). Low FSIs may also affect the spatial distribution of jobs due to their impact on residential 
suburbanization (Sridhar, 2010). Furthermore, blanket FSIs are implemented in Indian cities, 
covering large areas. This obstructs the ability to use land use regulations as a policy instrument 
to strategically increase densities around infrastructure networks.  
 
The process of evaluation for land that is publicly purchased offers wide opportunities for 
corruption. Valuation is done by the public agent acquiring the property without much specific 
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guideline except that the value should be determined by current use. While landowners cannot 
develop agricultural land, public land can easily be converted to residential or commercial use. 
This provides strong incentives to entrepreneurs to lobby public official and have them use 
eminent domain powers to purchase agricultural land and convert it. For instance, the land 
acquired for Yamuna Expressway connecting Noida and Agra in Uttar Pradesh was purchased by 
the state government at Rs 50 per square meter. However, a decade later, parcels in the same 
location is sold at Rs 15,000 per square meter.  
 
Rental properties in India are also subject to rent control. The negative impacts effects of rent 
controls are well documented both in India as well as internationally. It is believed that the 
longer a property is under rent control the higher is the difference between controlled rent and 
market rent. This motivates the tenants to never leave the premises. To make matters worse, 
there is also a provision to transmit the rented property to their relatives with the right to occupy 
their apartment after their death. De facto, a large part of the property right is being progressively 
transferred from the landlord to the tenant, except for the right to sell which remains with the 
landlord. Therefore, many rent controlled buildings are old and badly maintained. However, no 
redevelopment can occur until the tenants move voluntarily out the building. Since owners 
cannot vacate their premises, rent control creates the perverse incentive for landlords to see their 
property deteriorate or even collapse. Rent control, thus, contributes to a decrease in land supply 
because buildings which are under rent control cannot be redeveloped or even renovated. It also 
creates additional frictions that prevent land from being used efficiently. 
 
The combined effect of multiple layers of poorly conceived central, state, and municipal 
regulations contribute to an artificial urban land shortage in India (Bertaud and Malpezzi, 2001). 
As a result urban land prices are abnormally high in relation to India’s household income, and 
households and businesses consume less floor space than they could afford if the regulatory 
environment were reformed.  
 
Recognizing the negative impact and social tensions created by the rent control laws, the 
Government of India came out with a Model Rent Legislation (MRL) in 1992. Following the 
formulation of the model rent legislation, many states have repealed their old acts and formulated 
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new acts. These states include Karnataka (new act in 1999), Rajasthan (2001), Maharashtra 
(1999) and West Bengal (1997). Several other states are in the process of reforming their acts. 
The rent control reforms are already witnessing some positive results. For instance, in 
Maharashtra an increase in rent of space held by the General Insurance Corporation from Rs. 
51,000 per month to Rs. 680,000 per month led the corporation to look for rental space in other 
areas to store its old records and release the prime property for more productive uses (Business 
Standard, 2001).  
 
In sum, over the years, India has used a number of restrictive regulations to curb the 
development of urban land. These regulations were pursued with a dual objective: equity in 
distribution of land (e.g. ULCRA, rent control act) and curtailing urban congestion and 
densification (e.g. by progressively reducing FSI). Despite their noble intentions, these 
regulations achieved neither their egalitarian nor low-density objectives. Indian cities have the 
largest and densest slums in the world. Furthermore, these regulations account for much of the 
land price increase and extremely low consumption of floor space and land. By contrast, Town 
Planning Schemes (TPS)—a form of land readjustment system similar in its principle to the ones 
that had been used in the Republic of Korea; Taiwan, China; and Germany—have achieved 
much success in cities such as Ahmedabad. The average area developed each year in Ahmedabad 
is roughly equivalent to about 3.2% of the current built-up area of the Municipality of 
Ahmedabad. Besides the gradual reforms to ULCRA and rent control, two other initiatives are 
being tried that might open up land markets in a few states to overcome the existing constraints. 
These are: (i) township development and (ii) land pooling and readjustment. 
1989 1994 2000 2005 2010
A.  Raw count of data observations after basic pruning
Organised sector, urban areas 22,899 29,024 15,296 20,379 19,323
Organised sector, rural areas 10,457 13,625 10,275 14,722 13,778
Unorganised sector, urban areas 40,584 53,262 131,652 40,062 49,818
Unorganised sector, rural areas 53,846 53,051 131,125 39,562 49,719
Total 127,786 148,962 288,348 114,725 132,638
B.  Estimated number of plants in India using sample weights on raw counts in panel A
Organised sector, urban areas 54,675 64,921 62,835 63,044 72,750
Organised sector, rural areas 20,767 28,114 36,266 41,537 45,400
Unorganised sector, urban areas 2,823,783 2,967,126 5,048,512 4,901,061 7,396,214
Unorganised sector, rural areas 10,451,079 9,059,888 11,830,554 11,932,791 10,283,594
Total 13,350,303 12,120,050 16,978,167 16,938,433 17,797,958
C.  Raw count of data observations from panel A that report land and building values

Organised sector, urban areas 17,790 22,724 12,605 16,597 16,255
Organised sector, rural areas 9,358 12,211 9,474 13,263 12,498
Unorganised sector, urban areas 23,515 34,763 79,605 23,834 27,775
Unorganised sector, rural areas 46,406 91,102 72,247 33,446 40,261
Total 97,069 160,800 173,931 87,140 96,789
D.  Raw average land and building values for reporting plants (mean weighted by multiplier)

Organised sector, urban areas 193,290 259,760 400,218 461,964 754,869
Organised sector, rural areas 303,117 404,557 635,906 698,194 1,183,264
Unorganised sector, urban areas 3,540 5,498 6,998 8,535 15,457
Unorganised sector, rural areas 978 1,011 1,390 1,725 3,607
E.  Post imputation and weighting, the total land and building values for plants (in millions)
Organised sector, urban areas 14,204 21,820 36,188 39,426 77,397
Organised sector, rural areas 7,311 12,915 28,063 33,632 62,956
Unorganised sector, urban areas 10,889 21,213 38,638 33,134 136,622
Unorganised sector, rural areas 9,795 9,585 18,018 19,212 44,452
Total 42,200 65,533 120,908 125,404 321,427
F.  Aggregate land and building usage/output levels
Organised sector, urban areas 0.073 0.089 0.129 0.106 0.135
Organised sector, rural areas 0.080 0.095 0.129 0.102 0.129
Unorganised sector, urban areas 0.533 0.463 0.399 0.306 0.881
Unorganised sector, rural areas 0.414 0.345 0.359 0.341 0.552
Total 0.128 0.144 0.188 0.145 0.248
Table 1: Land and building inputs in manufacturing plants
Notes: Descriptive statistics taken from Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and National Sample Statistics (NSSO).
Industry Description Labour Capital Labour Capital Labour Capital
15 Food products and beverages 0.85 0.31 0.60 0.46 0.90 0.25
16 Tobacco 0.70 0.04 0.64 0.44 0.69 0.02
17 Textiles 0.85 0.34 0.62 0.39 0.82 0.26
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.80 0.47 0.24 0.55 0.74 0.44
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 0.77 0.24 0.58 0.43 0.72 0.21
20 Wood and some products of wood 0.75 0.27 0.70 0.34 0.75 0.28
21 Paper and paper products 0.73 0.31 0.69 0.41 0.76 0.25
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.68 0.50 0.57 0.44 0.67 0.42
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.71 0.35 0.69 0.39 0.77 0.35
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.79 0.31 0.66 0.43 0.73 0.32
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.83 0.46 0.73 0.41 0.81 0.41
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.72 0.34 0.78 0.43 0.70 0.31
27 Basic metals 0.76 0.30 0.67 0.38 0.75 0.41
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipments 0.87 0.39 0.69 0.39 0.87 0.36
29 Machinery and equipment  n.e.c. 0.95 0.26 0.77 0.37 0.92 0.26
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.41 0.38 0.77 0.41 0.23 0.21
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.78 0.47 0.72 0.42 0.75 0.32
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 0.61 0.53 0.81 0.34 0.59 0.42
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.77 0.44 0.62 0.42 0.81 0.37
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.96 0.27 0.62 0.41 0.87 0.34
35 Other transport equipment 0.83 0.24 0.66 0.38 0.84 0.30
36 Furniture;  manufacturing n.e.c. 0.72 0.30 0.75 0.34 0.71 0.28
Unweighted industry average 0.77 0.34 0.66 0.41 0.74 0.31
Notes: Table reports the industry-level coefficient values for labour and capital using the Sivadasan (2009) version of Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) productivity 
calculations for repeated cross-sections.
Full sector Organised sector
Table 2: Estimated coefficients with LP-Sivadasan methodology for labour and capital
Unorganised sector
Output Value-added Labour Buildings Land Other K
A. Full Indian manufacturing sector
District mean 1989 -0.90 -0.97 -0.44 -0.60
District mean 1994 -0.60 -0.75 -0.14 -0.26
District mean 2000 -0.82 -0.91 -0.28 -0.54
District mean 2005 -0.68 -0.79 -0.30 -0.46
District mean 2010 -0.57 -0.70 -0.20 -0.31
Average over surveys -0.71 -0.82 -0.27 -0.43
District SD 1989 0.56 0.60 0.44 0.63
District SD 1994 0.48 0.54 0.27 1.40
District SD 2000 0.52 0.58 0.35 0.59
District SD 2005 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.52
District SD 2010 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.61
Average over surveys 0.50 0.53 0.38 0.75
B. Organised sector
District mean 1989 -0.40 -0.50 -0.10 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16
District mean 1994 -0.34 -0.47 -0.08 -0.12 -0.01 -0.07
District mean 2000 -0.33 -0.49 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11
District mean 2005 -0.32 -0.46 -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 -0.11
District mean 2010 -0.24 -0.40 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.03
Average over surveys -0.32 -0.46 -0.07 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10
District SD 1989 0.38 0.44 0.29 0.38 0.37 0.55
District SD 1994 0.36 0.43 0.25 0.35 0.43 0.46
District SD 2000 0.39 0.42 0.27 0.39 0.44 0.45
District SD 2005 0.34 0.43 0.23 0.35 0.39 0.38
District SD 2010 0.37 0.43 0.28 0.38 0.41 0.46
Average over surveys 0.37 0.43 0.26 0.37 0.41 0.46
C. Unorganised sector
District mean 1989 -0.60 -0.60 -0.01 -0.02
District mean 1994 -0.53 -0.58 0.01 -0.28
District mean 2000 -0.65 -0.60 -0.10 -0.19
District mean 2005 -0.76 -0.71 -0.15 -0.30
District mean 2010 -0.51 -0.49 -0.05 -0.16
Average over surveys -0.61 -0.60 -0.06 -0.19
District SD 1989 0.30 0.27 0.09 0.26
District SD 1994 0.33 0.30 0.11 1.16
District SD 2000 0.34 0.30 0.12 0.32
District SD 2005 0.41 0.36 0.16 0.37
District SD 2010 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.32
Average over surveys 0.33 0.29 0.12 0.49
0.47
0.43
-0.19
0.52
0.41
0.47
0.52
-0.33
Notes: Table presents average values and standard deviations calculated across Indian districts. Plant-level survey weights are 
used to create district-level values. Values presented in this tables are unweighted statistics for district-level values. A more 
negative value indicates less misallocation.
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Table 3: Misallocation indices across districts
-0.05
-0.06
-0.13
-0.13
-0.08
0.18
0.20
0.18
0.28
-0.52
-0.28
-0.38
-0.30
-0.09
0.20
Baseline 
estimation with 
extended controls
Using basic set of 
control variables 
only
Without industry 
aggregation step
Using OLS TFP 
metrics
Weighting by log 
initial district 
employment
Using Hsieh-
Klenow metric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.  Change in misallocation for land and buildings
ULCRA repeal -0.057+ -0.059+ -0.171+++ -0.194++ -0.057+ n.a.
(0.028) (0.030) (0.056) (0.074) (0.029)
Adjusted R-squared 0.378 0.382 0.346 0.394 0.380
B.  Change in misallocation for value added
ULCRA repeal -0.136++ -0.127+ -0.293+++ -0.284++ -0.132+ -0.066+++
(0.059) (0.059) (0.093) (0.120) (0.062) (0.018)
Adjusted R-squared 0.477 0.481 0.477 0.418 0.471 0.433
Table 4: Changes in misallocation following the repeal of ULCRA, 2000-2010
Notes: Estimations quantify the change in misallocation levels surrounding the repeal of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Estimations are 
cross-sectional regressions that include 252 Indian districts. The outcome variable in Panel A is the change in land and building misallocation from 2000 
to 2010. The outcome variable in Panel B considers misallocation of value added. The primary explanatory variable is a (0,1) indicator variable for a 
state that repeals ULCRA by 2003. Estimations control for the initial value of the studied misallocation. Basic controls further include 12 initial traits of 
districts: log population density, log population, log share of urban population, log built-up area, the log share of built-up area, percent graduates, an 
infrastructure composite index, log minimum travel time to the 10 largest cities, a measure of local age profiles, the share of population with access to 
banking, the male-female sex ratio, and the share of district population in scheduled casts and tribes. The infrastructure composite index considers the 
population share with telecom access, the share with power access, the share of villages with paved roads, and the percent share with safe water. 
Extended controls further include log distance to national highway, log distance to state highway, log distance to railroads, and log distance to the closest 
metropolitan area. Regressions are unweighted and report standard errors clustered by state.
Baseline 
estimation with 
extended controls
Using basic set of 
control variables 
only
Without industry 
aggregation step
Using OLS TFP 
metrics
Weighting by log 
initial district 
employment
Using Hsieh-
Klenow metric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.  Misallocation for land and buildings
Changes in stamp duty 0.019++ 0.019++ 0.019++ 0.014 0.020++ n.a.
1989-2003 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.456 0.348 0.367 0.449
B.  Misallocation for value added
Changes in stamp duty 0.017++ 0.018+++ 0.021+ 0.016 0.017+++ -0.001
1989-2003 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.002)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 302
Adjusted R-squared 0.525 0.528 0.478 0.470 0.520 0.497
Table 5: Changes in misallocation associated with stamp duty changes, 1989-2010
Notes: Estimations quantify the change in misallocation levels surrounding adjustments in state-level stamp duties. The outcome variable in Panel A is 
land and building misallocation from 1989 to 2010. The outcome variable in Panel B considers misallocation of value added. The primary explanatory 
variable is the change in state-level stamp duty imposed on land transactions from 1989 to 2003. Basic and extended controls are the same as defined in 
Table 4. Regressions are unweighted and report standard errors clustered by state.
Baseline 
estimation
Considering 
aggregate fixed 
assets
Including district 
fixed effects
Without industry 
aggregation step
Using OLS TFP 
metrics
Considering 
output 
misallocation as 
DV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Unweighted estimations
Land and building 0.623+++ 0.582+++ 0.472+++ 0.365+++ 0.641+++
  misallocation (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.059) (0.040)
Other fixed assets 0.000+++ 0.000+++ 0.007+++ 0.162+++ 0.000+++
  misallocation (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.043) (0.000)
Employment 0.398+++ 0.518+++ 0.361+++ 0.451+++ 0.428+++ 0.264+++
  misallocation (0.053) (0.043) (0.062) (0.050) (0.047) (0.053)
Total fixed assets 0.493+++
  misallocation (0.031)
Observations 1816 1816 1816 1816 1824 1816
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.638 0.671 0.663 0.652 0.616
B. Weighting districts by initial employment levels
Land and building 0.622+++ 0.544+++ 0.591+++ 0.618+++ 0.587+++
  misallocation (0.041) (0.110) (0.058) (0.073) (0.064)
Other fixed assets 0.000++ 0.000++ 0.006+++ -0.025 0.001++
  misallocation (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.062) (0.000)
Employment 0.323+++ 0.512+++ 0.232+++ 0.335+++ 0.418+++ 0.178+++
  misallocation (0.047) (0.047) (0.072) (0.067) (0.049) (0.052)
Total fixed assets 0.425+++
  misallocation (0.045)
Observations 1804 1804 1804 1804 1812 1804
Adjusted R-squared 0.638 0.614 0.678 0.690 0.710 0.612
Table 6a: Value added misallocation as a function of factor misallocation
Notes: Estimations quantify the relationship between value added misallocation levels and that of factor inputs. Observations are district-year values. 
Regressions include year fixed effects, are unweighted, and report standard errors clustered by district.
Baseline 
estimation
Considering 
aggregate fixed 
assets
Without industry 
aggregation step
Using OLS TFP 
metrics
Considering 
output 
misallocation as 
DV
Excluding district 
covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Unweighted estimations
Value added -0.956+++ -0.967+++ -1.070+++ -0.978+++ -1.024+++ -0.994+++
  misallocation, 1989 (0.076) (0.069) (0.095) (0.091) (0.089) (0.080)
Land and building 0.176 0.138 0.139 0.251+ 0.217
  misallocation, 1989 (0.129) (0.174) (0.180) (0.134) (0.134)
Other fixed assets 0.121 0.015 0.002 0.110+ 0.107
  misallocation, 1989 (0.077) (0.120) (0.124) (0.066) (0.079)
Employment 0.018 0.045 0.182 0.107 -0.037 0.016
  misallocation, 1989 (0.087) (0.071) (0.118) (0.117) (0.086) (0.088)
Total fixed assets 0.269+++
  misallocation, 1989 (0.057)
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309
Adjusted R-squared 0.525 0.536 0.479 0.470 0.474 0.520
B. Weighting districts by initial employment levels
Value added -0.942+++ -0.903+++ -1.254+++ -1.266+++ -1.009+++ -0.962+++
  misallocation, 1989 (0.133) (0.132) (0.107) (0.131) (0.127) (0.130)
Land and building 0.441++ 0.669+++ 0.671+++ 0.405++ 0.594+
  misallocation, 1989 (0.224) (0.213) (0.257) (0.199) (0.302)
Other fixed assets -0.016 -0.145 -0.161 0.005 -0.101
  misallocation, 1989 (0.118) (0.123) (0.141) (0.091) (0.182)
Employment -0.035 0.106 0.079 0.176 -0.049 -0.193
  misallocation, 1989 (0.121) (0.088) (0.127) (0.135) (0.114) (0.156)
Total fixed assets 0.273+++
  misallocation, 1989 (0.069)
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309
Adjusted R-squared 0.572 0.575 0.611 0.628 0.534 0.492
Table 6b: Change in value added misallocation as a function of initial factor misallocation
Notes: Estimations quantify the relationship between the change in value added misallocation levels from 1989 to 2010 and initial factor misallocation 
in 1989. Observations are district-level values. Additional controls include the extended set of district-level traits in Table 4. Regressions report 
standard errors clustered by district.
Baseline 
estimation
Considering 
aggregate fixed 
assets
Including district 
fixed effects
Without industry 
aggregation step
Using OLS TFP 
metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Unweighted estimations
Land and building -0.645+++ -0.490+++ -0.547+++ -0.170++
  misallocation (0.088) (0.080) (0.076) (0.086)
Other fixed assets -0.001+++ -0.001+++ 0.002++ -0.257+++
  misallocation (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.069)
Employment -0.103 -0.165 -0.091 -0.042 0.194++
  misallocation (0.147) (0.136) (0.099) (0.122) (0.082)
Total fixed assets -0.584+++
  misallocation (0.064)
Observations 1816 1816 1816 1816 1824
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.169 0.577 0.201 0.108
B. Weighting districts by initial employment levels
Land and building -0.396++ -0.486+++ -0.346++ -0.012
  misallocation (0.163) (0.146) (0.175) (0.130)
Other fixed assets -0.001++ -0.001+++ -0.001 -0.250+++
  misallocation (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.083)
Employment 0.299 0.239 0.025 0.198 0.226
  misallocation (0.265) (0.226) (0.152) (0.255) (0.183)
Total fixed assets -0.353+++
  misallocation (0.096)
Observations 1804 1804 1804 1804 1812
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.127 0.575 0.134 0.122
Table 7: Labor productivity as a function of factor misallocation
Notes: See Table 6a.
Items Years
Section: Fixed Assets
Gross value
- Opening value 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2009
- Additions during the year 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
                    - Revaluations 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
                   - Actual additions 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
-  Deductions and adjustments 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2009
- Closing value 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2009
Depreciation: 
- Up to year beginning 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
- Provided during the year 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
- Total depreciation 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
Net value
- Opening value 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
- Closing value 1989, 2000, 2005, 2009
Section: Other Expenses
Rent paid 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2009
Section: Other Incomes
Rent received 2000, 2005, 2009
Appendix Table 1a: ASI data fields
Note: Assets are separated into land and building components. Values are in 
Rupees. The rent figures on land includes royalties on mines, quarries and 
similar assets.
Items Land Buildings Land and Buildings
- Owned 1989, 1994 1989, 1994 2000, 2005, 2010
- Hired 1989, 1994 1989, 1994 2000, 2005, 2010
Net opening balance 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
Net additions to owned  assets during reference year
- new 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
- used 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
- own construction 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
- total 1989, 1994 1989, 1994 2000, 2005, 2010
Depletion of assets during reference year
- sold 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
- discarded 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
Depreciation 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
Net closing balance 1989, 1994 1989, 1994
Rent payable on hired assets during reference period 1989, 1994 1989, 1994 2000, 2005, 2010
Appendix Table 1b: NSSO data fields
Section: Fixed assets owned and hired
Market value of assets (Rs.) as on last date of reference period
Note: Values are in Rupees. Year entry in the land, building and land and buildings columns indicate the survey years for 
which this information was collected.
Year District count
 Where at least one plant reports 
land and building values
ASI sample:
1989 416 414
1994 429 424
2000 359 358
2005 395 395
2010 401 398
NSSO sample:
1989 396 396
1994 414 413
2000 419 419
2005 420 420
2009 428 428
Appendix Table 2: District count for descriptive sample
